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How	useful	are	the	estimates	of	the	economic
consequences	of	Brexit?
In	this	blog,	Josh	De	Lyon	(LSE’s	Centre	for	Economic	Performance)	discusses	some	of
the	concerns	with	the	economic	forecasts	of	the	effects	of	Brexit	and	suggests	that	the
available	reports	are	informative	of	the	likely	consequences	of	Brexit.	He	also	provides	an
insight	into	how	such	research	should	be	interpreted,	beyond	the	headline-grabbing	figures
reported	in	the	news.
On	29	January,	a	new	government	impact	assessment	on	the	economic	effects	of	Brexit	was
leaked	to	Buzzfeed.	The	report	predicted	that	a	“soft”	Brexit	would	restrict	economic	growth	by	2	per	cent,	while	a
“hard”	Brexit	or	“no	deal”	scenario	would	reduce	growth	by	8	per	cent	over	a	15-year	period.	This	is	broadly	in	line
with	almost	all	other	economic	predictions	of	the	economic	consequences	of	Brexit.	Following	the	leak	of	the	report,
some	politicians	and	commentators	were	quick	to	discredit	the	integrity	of	such	predictions.	For	example,	Steve
Baker,	an	MP	and	a	minister	in	the	Department	for	Exiting	the	EU,	claimed	that	these	predictions	are	“always	wrong”.
The	evidence	on	the	effect	of	Brexit	on	the	economy	is	almost	unanimous:	it	predicts	that	Brexit	will	cost	the	UK
economy	in	the	region	of	1	to	10	per	cent	of	GDP	in	the	long	run,	with	greater	costs	for	a	hard	Brexit	relative	to	a	soft
Brexit.	The	mechanism	driving	these	results	is	straightforward.	The	EU	currently	receives	around	43	per	cent	of	UK
exports	(House	of	Commons	Briefing	Paper,	2017).	When	the	UK	leaves	the	EU,	barriers	to	trade	will	rise,	causing
trade	and	therefore	GDP	to	fall.	These	findings	come	from	HM	Treasury	(2016),	OECD	(2016),	PWC	(2017),	NIESR
(2016)	and	Dhingra	et	al.	(2017)	among	others,	in	addition	to	the	recently-leaked	internal	government	report.	These
estimates	often	account	for	the	benefits	of	new	trade	deals	with	non-EU	countries	such	as	the	United	States,	China,
and	Australia.	On	top	of	this,	other	studies	show	that	Brexit	will	cause	a	fall	in	inward	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)
of	around	28%,	leading	to	a	3.4%	decline	in	real	income	(Dhingra	et	al.,	2016).
The	exception	to	these	predictions	is	the	study	by	the	group	“Economists	for	Free	Trade”,	who	predict	that	Brexit	will
benefit	the	UK	economy	(Minford	et	al.,	2018).	However,	the	methodology	used	in	this	study	has	been	heavily
criticised	by	many	economists	and	commentators	for	making	wildly	unrealistic	assumptions,	the	details	of	which	are
discussed	in	a	previous	blog	post	by	Dhingra	et	al.	(2017).
So	where	do	the	numbers	produced	in	the	government	impact	assessment	and	other	studies	come	from?	The
fundamental	concept	underlying	these	predictions	is	known	as	the	“Gravity”	model	of	trade,	which	predicts	that	the
amount	of	trade	in	goods	and	services	that	flows	between	countries	will	depend	on	the	economic	size	of	each
country	and	the	distance	between	them.	Gravity	models	have	been	very	successful	in	predicting	actual	trade	flows
and	are	often	regarded	as	one	of	the	great	successes	of	empirical	economics	(Anderson,	2011).	In	relation	to	the	UK
and	the	EU,	gravity	models	accurately	predict	that	there	should	be	a	high	volume	of	trade	between	the	two	bodies.
When	barriers	to	trade	are	wedged	in	between	the	UK	and	EU,	as	is	inevitable	with	Brexit,	trade	between	the	two	will
become	costlier.	The	volume	of	trade	between	the	UK	and	EU	is	likely	to	fall	and,	in	some	cases,	the	UK	will	switch
to	second-best	trade	partners.	These	costs	then	filter	through	the	economy.	This	is	the	simplified	mechanism	driving
the	results	of	the	reports	discussed	above.
It	is	good	practice	to	critically	analyse	economic	research.	Economists	themselves	spend	much	of	their	time
providing	feedback	on	the	research	of	others	with	the	aim	of	improving	the	quality	of	the	overall	body	of	research.
Every	study	is	revised	many	times	to	ensure	that	the	conclusions	are	solid.	There	are	of	course	limitations	with	the
literature	on	the	economic	effects	of	Brexit.	For	example,	no	sovereign	country	has	ever	left	the	EU,	so	there	is	no
historical	evidence	to	benchmark	against	the	forecasts.	Also,	it	can	be	difficult	to	translate	the	predicted	trade	effects
into	an	overall	welfare	effect	without	adding	more	economic	structure	to	the	model.	However,	the	strength	of	the
prediction	that	Brexit	will,	on	average,	be	harmful	to	the	economy	comes	from	the	near-unanimous	consensus	of
negative	predictions	from	different	types	of	models	based	on	varying	assumptions.	Across	all	scientific	fields,	results
that	are	reproduced	multiple	times	are	considered	most	reliable	and	economics	is	no	different	in	this	respect.	That
being	said,	economists	are	often	guilty	of	producing	academic	research	that	is	not	accessible	to	the	public.	In	the
case	of	Brexit,	the	methodology	of	these	studies	is	perhaps	still	somewhat	of	a	“black	box”	to	those	outside	of	the
field,	given	the	relative	complexity	of	the	analyses.	But	the	findings	of	these	reports	are	clear	and	should	be	taken
seriously:	Brexit	will	reduce	trade	and	investment,	therefore	directly	harming	the	economy.
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What	is	perhaps	less	clear	is	precisely	how	these	estimates	should	be	interpreted.	Each	analysis	considers	a	pair	of
hypothetical	situations.	The	first	is	where	the	UK	leaves	the	EU	and	terms	of	the	agreement	are	explicitly	stated	as
the	assumptions	of	the	model.	For	example,	a	hard	Brexit	scenario	might	assume	that	the	UK	leaves	the	Single
Market	and	Customs	Union	and	trades	according	to	WTO	terms.	Importantly,	each	analysis	is	very	open	about	the
type	of	agreement	that	is	being	estimated.	The	second	situation	is	the	counterfactual,	whereby	the	UK	does	not
leave	the	EU	and	the	economy	evolves	as	it	would	have	done	in	the	absence	of	Brexit.	By	estimating	the	economic
differences	between	the	two	situations,	the	causal	effect	of	Brexit	can	be	isolated.	That	is,	the	estimates	do	not
predict	the	future	level	of	GDP	in	the	economy.	Instead,	they	isolate	the	causal	effect	of	Brexit	on	the	economy.	In
other	words,	it	does	not	say	“the	UK	economy	will	grow	by	x	per	cent	after	Brexit”	but	instead	“as	a	direct	result	of
Brexit,	the	growth	of	the	UK	economy	will	be	x	per	cent	different	to	how	it	would	otherwise	have	been”.
Public	Domain
It	is	impossible	to	predict	the	exact	economic	effect	of	a	change	as	complex	as	Brexit.	We	will	never	directly	observe
the	economic	effect	of	Brexit	because	the	economy	is	shaped	by	a	wide	variety	of	factors,	many	of	which	are
unrelated	to	Brexit.	In	fact,	further	economic	analysis	will	be	necessary	in	years	to	come	to	identify	the	impact	of
Brexit	after	the	event.
But	this	certainly	does	not	mean	that	the	forecasts	are	useless	–	they	can,	and	should,	be	used	to	guide	policy.
There	are	many	cases	where	the	work	of	economists	has	helped	to	shape	government	policy	for	the	better.	A	good
example	is	the	introduction	of	the	national	minimum	wage	in	April	1999,	which	has	been	shown	to	have	successfully
raised	wages	without	significantly	harming	employment.	The	Institute	for	Government	reported	in	2010	that	the
minimum	wage	was	most	frequently	cited	among	members	of	the	UK	Political	Studies	Association	as	the	most
successful	policy	intervention	since	1980.	The	introduction	of	the	minimum	wage	followed	the	recommendation	of
many	economists,	including	those	on	the	Low	Pay	Commission,	who	recommend	the	level	of	the	minimum	wage.
One	of	the	key	policy	prescriptions	from	the	research	on	the	economic	effects	of	Brexit	is	that	a	hard	Brexit	scenario
is	considerably	costlier	to	the	economy	than	a	soft	Brexit	scenario.	Another	example	comes	from	the	work	of
Dhingra,	Machin	and	Overman	(2017)	who	show	how	the	economic	effect	of	Brexit	will	vary	across	the	UK,	with
some	areas	to	be	hit	significantly	harder	than	others.
Governments	must	consider	a	whole	set	of	objectives	when	setting	policy,	of	which	the	economy	is	just	one.
Likewise,	voters	will	have	considered	many	factors	that	go	beyond	economic	issues	when	casting	their	vote	in	the
referendum	on	June	23rd,	2016.	But	given	the	magnitude	of	the	decision	of	the	UK	to	exit	the	EU,	it	is	essential	to
have	a	solid	idea	of	how	this	will	affect	the	economy	and	UK	citizens.	Hopefully,	the	research	agenda	discussed	here
is	being	considered	as	part	of	the	overall	policy-setting	process	for	the	UK’s	separation	from	the	EU.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	of	the	LSE.	
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Josh	De	Lyon	is	a	research	assistant	in	CEP’s	trade	programme.
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